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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The court's reference to statutes against indecent exposure might
well apply also to those against disturbing the peace, disorderly con-
duct, indecent behavior with juveniles, and others. Offenses of this
kind may be committed through a wide variety of conduct, and it
is not to be expected that the legislature will undertake the cumber-
some and probably impossible task of providing for all detailed
violations in advance. Furthermore, an incomplete enumeration
would provide a technical loophole through which a guilty defend-
ant might evade the law. The avowed intention of the reporters
and of the legislature in enacting Article 104 of the Criminal Code
was to draft a general definition which would "include all types of
disorderly houses and places known as such, or which might become
known as such in the future."2
While the decision in the Truby case might be justified by the
admittedly broad scope of Article 104, it would be unfortunate if
some of the court's generalizations should be extended further. If
the court should extend the reasoning of the Truby case and adopt
a policy of undue technicality, the very foundation on which the
Criminal Code is based will be dealt a crippling blow.
ELMON W. HOLMES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS UNDER THE
UNITED STATES WAREHOUSE AcT-Defendant was charged with
numerous violations of a state statute regulating grain warehouses.
Included were the exaction of unjust discriminatory rates, conflict
of interest as warehouseman and dealer in grain, failure to provide
reasonable and adequate facilities, improper mixing of public and
private grades of grain, failure to publish rates, and failure to obtain
a state license. Defendant, licensee under the United States Ware-
house Act,' set up the exclusive coverage of that act. Held, where
a matter over which a state asserts the right to control is in any way
regulated by a federal act, "the federal scheme prevails though it is
a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the state."
Rice v. Santa Elevator Corporation, 67 S. Ct. 1146 (U. S. 1947).2
Truby case, said: "The decisions cited supra, therefore, are not to be regarded
as a departure from the doctrine, now well settled, that a statute which defines
and denounces certain conduct as a crime is not rendered invalid by investing
the trial judge with some discretion in determining whether the facts of a given
ease shall bring it within the purview of the law."
23. Reporters' Comment, Arts. 104, 105, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
1. 89 Stat. 486 (1916) as amended, 7 U. S. C. A. § 241 (1931).
2. See also the companion case of First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. Fed-
eral.Power Commission, 828 U. S. 152, 66 S. Ct. 906, 90 L. Ed. 1148 (1945). This
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This decision represents a departure from the pattern of federal-
state relations which seemingly had been carefully nurtured since
the decision in Erie v. Tompkins, and more particularly from the
highly developed idea of these relations best expressed by the term
"coordinate action."4 The federal and state legislative history indi-
cates that the purposes of the two political entities are entirely dif-
ferent with regard to the regulation of warehouses engaged in the
storage of grain for interstate commerce. Federal regulation has
as its primary objective enhancement of the value of warehouse
receipts for purposes of collateral in financial transactions. The
states have had as their principal objective the protection of pro-
ducers and of the public generally from abuses by warehouse inter-
ests seeking to exploit a strategic position in the flow of grain from
producer to consumer. To attain this objective the states have
enacted comprehensive regulation, guided by experience accumu-
lated since Munn v. Illinois.
The federal act in question did touch each of the subjects em-
braced in the complaints enumerated heretofore, but in most in-
stances did not create irreconcilable problems. For example, in the
field of warehouse rates the state statute empowers the Commerce
Commission to fix rates;' the Secretary of Agriculture, the adminis-,
trator of the federal act, on the other hand, cannot fix rates although
he may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue a license if the rates are
unreasonable or exorbitant.7 With respect to the assumption of a
dual position by warehousemen-a practice forbidden by state regu-
lation,8 the federal act merely requires disclosure of such dual posi-
tion.' Similar comparison could, as the Court points out, "be applied
to each of the nine charges which we have summarized."
The Court recognized that if the federal act be construed as
supreme only where there is a conflict, the federal system could be
case can perhaps be differentiated on its facts but certainly is a much stronger
case than the one here discussed.
3. 804 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1937). For an illuminating
discussion of this problem prior to 1928 see the comment by Felix Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts (1928)
13 Corn. L. Q. 499.
4. Conceived and developed by Justice Rutledge in the now famous case of
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342
(1946).
5. 94 U. S. 113, 2-4 L. Ed. 77 (1876). The leading case in which a divided
court upheld state control of grain elevators in spite of commercial implications.
6. I1. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 111 2/3, § 32 et seq.
7. 39 Stat. 490 (1916), 1 U. S. C. A. § 270 (1916).
8. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1984) c. 114, § 194c.
9. 39 Stat. 480 (1916), 7 U. S. C. A. § 260 (1916).
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preserved intact and the state left free to protect local interests. It
was also recognized that Congress has here legislated in a field
traditionally occupied by the states,' ° and therefore there must be a
"clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to supersede the historic
police powers of the state." Nonetheless, state control is drastically
curtailed because of an amendment to the Warehouse Act in 1931,12
which states that "this act shall be exclusive with respect to all
persons receiving a license hereunder so long as said license remains
in effect"--an amendment inspired chiefly by conflicts between state
and federal law affecting the negotiability of warehouse receipts. 8
In the analogous case of Southern Pacific Railway v. Arizona, 4
concerning the constitutionality of state regulation of train lengths,
the Court resolved the problem into two parts: First, had Congress
by legislative enactment restricted the power of the state to so regu-
late trains? Second, if not, does the action of the state contravene
the commerce clause?
I In answer to the first question, the Court used the "clear and
manifest intention" test of the Napier case' 5 and found that limiting
the length of trains was not included in the powers given the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and that since Congress itself had
*specifically refused to limit the length of trains, the field was a
valid one for state legislation so long as the commerce clause was not
contravened.
In answer to the second question, the Court pointed out that
in the absence of conflicting regulation there was a residuum of
power in the state to govern matters of local concern, even though
interstate commerce is affected to some extent. The Court recog-
nized that while some state legislation would clearly conflict, other
legislation would not. For the infinite variety of cases between
these two extremes, the court set up this test:
"Reconciliation of the conflicting claims of the state and national
power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommoda-
10. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 11 (1876); Budd v. People,
143 U. S. 517, 12 S. Ct. 468, 36 L. Ed. 247 (1891) ; Brass v. State, 153 U. S. 391,
14 S. Ct. 857, 38 L. Ed. 757 (1898).
11. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 272 U. S. 605, 47 S. Ct. 207, 71 L.
Ed. 432 (1926).
12. 46 Stat. 1463 (1981), 7 U. S. C. A. § 241 (Supp. 1946).
18. H. R. Rep. 7, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess. (1930) 10, 22-26 (recommendations
of the Secretary of Agriculture).
14. 825 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1944).
15. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 272 U. S. 605, 47 S. Ct. 207, 71
L. Ed. 482 (1926).
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tion of the competing demands of the state and national interests
involved."
Applying this test the Court found that the state interests were out-
weighed by "the interests of the nation in an adequate, economical
and efficient railway transportation service."16 In the present case,
the Court stressed the provisions of the 1931 amendment and the
intention of Congress, and did not go into the test for reconciliation
at any great length. It seems that the 'demands of the state' should
outweigh the 'national interests involved' whenever the federal act
could remain effective without destroying much essential regulation
by the state. Here, however, it is only where the federal act failed
to mention certain activities at all that the states are left free to act.1
This admixture of views, plus the possibility of substantial injury
to the public and confusion in the industry led to a vigorous and
well-reasoned dissent by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Rut-
ledge concurred apparently thinking in terms of "coordinated
action."
The point of departure between the majority and the dissenting
views appears to rest almost wholly on whether federal statutes and
agencies are to be supreme and exclusive in the limited realm of
regulation in the interest of the security of warehouse receipts (a
fair implication from the statute in question), leaving financial
structures and kindred matter for state control, or whether even
where the implication of exclusiveness is clear, there should none-
theless be left room for coordinated action.
Obviously, the Court was well within the limits of statutory
interpretation. The decision was a clear departure, however, from
the principle that the Court will not "assume in advance that a state
will construe its law as to bring it in conflict with . . . an act of
Congress."1 A strong factor that influenced the majority to pre-
clude any state regulation in an area where federal exclusiveness can
be sustained may have been to forestall the inherent possibilities of
playing off a state agency against a federal agency to which only
coordinate jurisdiction has been attributed. 9
16. For an interesting study of the position of Chief Justice Stone in similar
situations, see Konefsky, Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court (1945).
17. Rice v. Santa Elevator Corp., 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1155 (U. S. 1947) (gen-
erally, regulations to prevent the creation of unsound financial structures). Nice
problems are conjured up with which the Court refused to deal until'"they arise."
18. Allen Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S.
740, 62 S. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942) and related cases.
19. Arkansas Power and Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 156 F.
(2d) 821 (App. D. C. 1946).
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It is submitted that the view of the dissenters might also have
been permissible without transcending the limits of statutory inter-
pretation2" and that the possibility of dissatisfaction and confusion
in the industry such as existed in the insurance field between the
time of deciding the Southeastern Underwriters' case 2' and the
passage of the McCarran Act22 might thus be avoided.2" Such a
possibility, of course, is very real where a body of comprehensive
state regulation dating from Munn v. Illinois,24 decided some seventy
years earlier, is stricken down in favor of a toothless federal act,
having as its chief sanction the revocation of a federal license ob-
tained on a voluntary basis and which act is administered by an
understaffed, overworked Secretary of Agriculture, whose organiza-
tional setup is woefully inadequate to cope with the duties imposed
on it by the Court's ruling.
ROBERT L. ROLAND, III
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOoLs-A
New Jersey statute authorized a township board of education, to re-
imburse parents of public and Catholic parochial school children
money expended for transportation on public buses. Plaintiff, a local
taxpayer, challenged the statute as being in violation of the First1
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,2 by
20. Ibid. In this case, which involved the question of whose authority, that
of the state or the commission, was superior in the regulation of the utility's
method of accounting, two members of the circuit court of appeals found a
conflict sufficient to invoke the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. The other
member of the court, reasoning in a manner analogous to that advocated in this
writing, concluded that there was no conflict justifying the application of the
act. The case is now pending in the United States Supreme Court.
21. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533, 64 S.
Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
22. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1011 (1945).
28. For an interesting commentary on this situation see Comment (1946)
30 Marquette L. Rev. 77-97.
24. 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
1. The First Amendment is now applicable to the states by transmission
through the Fourteenth: Schneider v. State, 808 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed.
155 (1989); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 819 U. S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed.
1292, 146 A. L. R. 81 (1942); Prince v. Massachusetts, 821 U. S. 158, 64 S.
Ct. 488, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 823 U. S. 516, 530, 65 S. Ct.
315, 822, 89 L. Ed. 480 (1944); West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 819 U. S. 624, 689, 68 S. Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 1638, 147
A. L. R. 674, 682 (1948).
2. The problem of state support of religious schools and the teaching of
religion in public schools has received considerable attention in recent years. See
cases collected In 14 L. R. A. 418 (1892), 5 A. L. R. 879 (1920), 141 A. L. R.
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